Sins Against Democracy
David Marcoua

John M. Shimkus is the Congressman representing the 19th District of Illinois. On
March 25, 2009 in a hearing of the House Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
Representative Shimkus declared that “The earth will end only when God declares its time

is over,” arguing against the need for concern about climate change. Whether or not you
agree with Representative Shimkus, his comments contain the very best of our democracy.

We can see the whole range of democracy in the proceedings of the debate and weighing
of ideas that go on in our cathedrals of democracy every day. Representative Shimkus is
a voice of the people, elected by everyday Americans to serve their interests and support
their values in our political process. What is equally important however is that his voice is

not the only voice. Every day and in a thousand different fashions we see the goals of the
American people being articulated and debated, not only by our elected representatives,
but in interest groups, lobbyists, our media institutions, in protests, and in literature1.
They must discourse, debate, argue and persuade until some form of consensus is reached.

The tapestry of discourse and dialogue in America is diverse and challenging for anyone
seeking to bring order to our democratic system. This, however, should not discourage us

from doing so, or attempting to do so. We should see the range of views and ideas as an
opportunity to improve and refine our democratic system, not as an inhibitor. To bring
order from chaos we need a mechanism to take the best qualities of discourse and distil
them. This mechanism is deliberative democracy, the nature of which we will discuss here.
The specific claim that this paper will address is the content and form of this discourse.

It is not a question of which voices we will accept nor one of limiting the subjects of
1
Dahl calls the variety of different governmental bodies “staggering” (Dahl 117), not only in the number
of individual local or state governments, but unions, interest groups, and a thousand different organizations of every
shape.
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our conversations and decision making, but rather I want to raise the question of what
reasons we will accept. It is a question of when we engage in political debate, what sorts of
reasons we can and should we provide for the positions we support. The focal point of this
examination will be part of the claims made by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson in
Democracy and Disagreement. Gutmann and Thompson advocate that in our democratic

discourse we should include moral reasons into the process of justifying our positions.
Deliberative democracy aspires to a politics in which citizens and their accountable
representatives… are committed to making decisions that they can justify to everyone bound
by them. This commitment entails the integration of substantive moral argument into the
democratic process that manifest the equal political status of citizens. The political process…
must be as morally defensible in their content as in their conditions.2

They believe that if we want our politics to be as justifiable as possible, we both must

and should include a method of solving and accounting for our moral nature and our
moral disagreements3. In the debate that frames democracy, each voice is motivated by a
particular set of values, and Gutmann and Thompson think we are better off including this

in our democratic process.
There are issues with debating about values, specifically because of how differently
each of us sees them. They claim two responses to this concern by first asserting the tool of
deliberative democracy, which as we will see shortly, helps to account for these differences

in a constructive manner. Their second response is the more important of the two: “A
democratic theory that is to remain faithful to its moral premises and aspirations for justice

must take seriously the need for moral argument within these processes and appreciate
the moral potential of such deliberation.”4 This defense has two parts. It establishes the
2
Gutmann, Amy, and Dennis Thompson. Democracy and Disagreement. (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap
P of Harvard UP, 1996), p. 50.
3
When Gutmann and Thompson refer to morality, we can find symmetry when, now and later in this
paper, I refer to the values we hold. Morality is a vision of what is right and wrong, which is fundamentally based
on questions of what we value as individuals and a society.
4
Gutmann et al., p. 40.
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necessity for moral discourse (a discourse about values), a way of saying that even if this
process is hard, we should pursue it. The more interesting claim is that if we are to stick to
our roots, we have to accept that our personal values can and should be debated. They find,
and I agree, that our democratic institutions are founded on a particular set of values. If we

could come together to debate and discover these concrete values, then we must concede
that we can talk about other values in the same way.
I do not deny that we managed to agree on core democratic values. The formation of
the United States Constitution saw many people, from many places, come together to agree

on the values and rights that make Americans who they are. Gutmann and Thompson
want us to say that if we have accomplished this task, why can we not use democracy and

her institutions, the same set of rules and principles that helped us build the foundation
of our nation, to debate and decide on how other values should motivate our politics. It
is against this belief and claim that I will build my arguments. I will first develop a model

of democracy and deliberation. Then, we will discuss how each of us fit into democracy
as servant and master to the system. After discussing Gutmann and Thompson’s particular

views on moral disagreement and the merits of deliberation further, we will begin the
principle critique of their views, ending by proposing possible alternatives and solutions.
Before we understand morality in our democracy, we must have an understanding of how

these hallowed institutions function.
Deliberative democracy is a manifestation of a democratic system that asks that its
citizens accept a conception of government that appeals to the common good.5 At its
heart it relies on its citizens’ capacity to engage in deliberation about the appropriate role
of government and the right course of action. No reasonable application of deliberative
democracy can expect every citizen in a modern state to debate over every issue that faces
us. The issues are so complex, the positions so varied, the expertise needed so vast, that
5
This conception of the common good as the motivating force was deeply influenced by John Rawls, particularly A Theory of Justice and The Law of Peoples. The core contractualist claim is something that carries itself
into deliberation and into the manifestation of just democratic will. Indeed, much of what I will claim here on fairness,
humanity, and appropriateness was directed and guided by these two works.
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such a feat would be well beyond us. What deliberative democracy asks, in the real world,
is that those who exercise authority in our government, the elected representatives, conduct

themselves in a particular fashion. It asks that when these individuals seek to justify their
positions to their peers and the populace and to persuade others of the actions they desire,

they must do so not merely on interests and principles that are unique to them or even
their constituents. A valuable deliberative process seeks to reach decisions that all members
would find acceptable, based on principles that all would find acceptable, and argued in a
manner in which all would find acceptable—the greatest common denominator of views.

Deliberative democracy is the best alternative that civilization has had on how to
govern itself. I believe that a just authority derives itself from the polity and their consent

to be subject to the powers above them. Thus democracy is the only justifiable source of
political power, and deliberation is the only way to give this power a defensible voice. I
advocate that, within the framework of deliberative democracy, it is necessary for us to
limit ourselves in a very particular way – specifically that we should not accept personal
values as good reasons for political decisions.6 The argument is that when we exercise the
virtues of our deliberative system, we must do so very cautiously and why this caution
should prohibit us from providing our individual values as reasons. Individual value based
reasons are problematic in my view not only because they fail to meet certain standards of
our deliberative discourse, but also because the decisions that can be justified with them are
particularly harmful outside our idealized construct. I also believe that even when applied
correctly, they do irreparable harm to the system of democratic deliberation itself. However,
in order to understand how we might criticize the role these particular value justifications,
we need to develop a sufficient conception of the appropriate role of a government that is

based on the principles of deliberative democracy.
There are many different views of the systems of the governments we form, and it
can be difficult, if not impossible, to determine which system best suits and serves humanity.
The issue of resolving which system is most appropriate is compounded by the fact that even
6
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Personal values are what we will come to refer to as civilian values later in this paper.
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as there are a multitude of different political philosophies, there are a plethora of different

cultures and traditions that must be accounted for. The task before anyone attempting
to find the best form of government is simply put, functionally impossible. I believe that
we will find the most satisfying path not in the courageous pursuit of absolute truths, but

rather in the cowardly path of least resistance. We accomplish this by assuming not that
there is some best form to be found, but in assuming that the best form of government is
an absence of form. I believe that we can craft an image of government that is based on the

barest of principles, but is flexible and resilient. We will briefly examine my vision of the
role of government, and the role of citizens, within this deliberative democratic system.
To create an image of government, we must briefly distinguish between the
fundamental duties of government and the incidental roles that government fills.7 Although
I do not envision a paternalistic government, the parent-child relationship can serve as a
rubric here. A fundamental duty of parents is to create conditions for their children to grow
into healthy independent adults. The parents’ job is to insure the health and well-being of
their child, but few would say that it is the fundamental duty of a parent to, for example,

provide Band-Aids® for scraped knees. At the same time, we can see how under the core
duties of care the parent might decide that it is their function to do just that.
We can see government as acting in a very similar way. The government’s fundamental
role is not to provide a legal system or police officers, Band-Aids® for societal ills. Instead,

the government and those who guide it may see that in order for the society to grow and
thrive under the democratic vision, it is necessary to provide such services. It is not the
government’s fundamental duty to build roads or provide healthcare; these are means to
the common ends of a democratic governmental system – the enabling of democratic
citizenship and the pursuit of the good life for its members. We can see how each parent
has a certain fundamental duty to his or her child, so what then in the fundamental duty of
7
We should consider the expression fundamental in the most robust sense. John Hart Ely makes the observation “most fundamental-rights theorists start edging toward the door when someone mentions jobs, food, or housing:
those are important, sure, but they aren’t fundamental” (Ely 59). We can consider fundamental duties to enable things
like welfare and unemployment benefits, but we cannot consider them to independently fundamental.
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a democratic governmental system?
We have gone over to some extent what I believe to be the greatest asset of
deliberative democracy: the nature and results of the deliberation that occurs. If we can
identify this as being the strength of deliberative democracy—its ability to create systems
which all members can respect based on principles all have agreed to8 – it seems that the
fundamental role of democracy then is in part to embrace the base principles that make this
possible, like the freedom of speech. It would then seem part of the fundamental role of a
deliberative democracy is to protect the core values of the society that allow for its members

to participate and grow as democratic citizens.9
There are many different views of what these core values are and to what extent we
possess each of them. Some may claim, for example, that the right to free speech is absolute,

and that no matter what the circumstances I should be able to say and communicate
whatever I chose. Others may claim that in order for me to have a fair chance to participate

as a democratic citizen I must necessarily have a certain amount of material wealth or
education or healthcare. We should not be concerned with the extent or limitations of these
rights; their content is not particularly useful. What we should realize about each of these
core values is that each of them are rights that our democratic society have determined are
instrumental to being democratic citizens. We have determined that at the very lowest level,
in order for us as people to participate in our society and shape the types of decisions that

our government makes, we must have these certain things.
We have reasoned that a deliberative democracy has two important features: a
deliberative system, and a belief in the certain rights and values that enable democratic
citizenship to occur. In these two sets of features, we have a convergence of elements that
8
Dahl writes, “Although that process [of democracy and deliberation] cannot guarantee that all the members
will literally live under laws of their own choosing, it expands self-determination to its maximum feasible limits”
(Dahl 54). It is important that we not only live under laws that we endorse, but that we help to form.
9
In Federalist No. 37, Madison writes, “On comparing… these valuable ingredients of liberty we must perceive at once the difficult of mingling them together in their due proportions” (Madison 223). What he expresses in
No. 37 is the tension between the powers of the State and those of the individual, and he identifies a strong democratic
citizenry as the best way to maintain this balance. In the same sense, we get the best democracy when we have the
best citizens we can.
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should shape conditions where the democratic citizen can thrive. It then falls upon these
individual citizens to determine what course they believe their democracy should take and

develop reasons for why their government should act in such a way. In a sense we have
different tiers of motivations at work in this deliberative democracy. We have the abstract
entity of the government, which has the responsibility to create conditions for democratic

citizenship. We also have the citizenry, which is both subject to and the composition of
the government. To reconcile these two elements of each democratic citizen, it is useful to
speak of each member of society as a citizen and civilian. When we engage in deliberative

discourse with our peers on issues and choices that face our government, we are acting
as the citizen. As a citizen, we are utilizing the types of freedoms and abilities that we are
granted within our agreed set of core values.
Citizens are the ones on the soapbox, preaching to the crowds on why the government

should or should not be doing what the government is or is not doing. To understand
the citizen, we need to understand the reasons that we enter into a democracy and how
this motivates the goals and values that the citizen holds. The fundamental reason that we
restrain ourselves within the confines of the state or society is because we know in the end
these sacrifices allow us more freedom overall. We desire this security and assistance because
we believe that it will help us realize our vision of the good life. I chose to enter society so

that I have the chance to accumulate the means to fulfilling my vision of the good life.10 It
is from these avenues that the citizen derives the values that motivate his political decision-

making.
The first duty of the citizen, then, is to ensure that citizens themselves can exist. Insofar
as we see the democratic system, and in our discussion the deliberative system, as a means

to achieve the goals which we each share when we enter the society, we must make sure
that the democratic system itself is strong and intact. However, the citizen has a secondary
role: to insure we have the tools to find the good life. We enter into a society, or democracy,
10
Rousseau writes, “The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect the whole
common force the person and goods of each associate” which we resolve by “the total alienation of each associate,
together with all his rights, to the whole community” (Rousseau 191).
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because we believe it will enable us to find the good life, not because we value democracy or
society independently. The citizen must then value providing the means for the members

of the society to pursue the good life. The citizen is the means by which we direct our
government to give us the tools to find the good life. However, citizen is not the whole of

the person; every member of society is also, in part, a civilian.
Before we were citizens, we were civilians, seeking the good life. The civilian exists in
a similar capacity in all political systems because everywhere all persons seek the good life
for themselves. It is the civilian within that initially committed himself to the democratic
system and ceded part of his individual power to create circumstances that would enable the
good life. . Conceptions of the good life vary from person to person and society to society.

It is the responsibility of each civilian to pursue the good life in whatever way he sees fit.
Although there resides civilian and citizen in each member of a democratic society,
we must carefully divide not only their values but also their natures. The civilian is a
fundamentally selfish person, with a distinct vision of the good life that is separate from any
other person’s interests. It is not that the civilian is incapable of empathy or consideration;
for example I may personally value charity as an important element of the good life. What
is important is that the civilian’s motivation is to find the civilian’s good life, whatever that

may be. The citizen is different because the citizen does not value any one person over
another. The citizen cares as much about his ability to be a democratic citizen as he cares
about his neighbor’s ability to be a democratic citizen. The citizen values the purpose of the

democracy, which applies to all, and the civilian values his vision of the good life, which
applies only to him.
We can understand that people come together to form governments not because that
government is in itself good. Rather, we form governments to try and serve our own ends.

This is how we should begin to see the relationship between citizens, who constitute the
strength and content of the democratic government, and the civilians, who are the ones this

government serves.

56

Spring 2010 | SPICE | Philosophy, Politics & Economics Undergraduate Journal

We are not just citizens nor are we just civilians; thus our reasons and values
intermingle. How do our civilian perceptions of the good life play into our reasoning, our
politics, and our discourse? The fundamental democratic values of our society form one set
of reasons while the second set is personal, namely the individual values of the civilian. For
example, one might claim that his vision of the good life requires all people to have faith in
the divine, which is based on personal values, without a direct appeal to the core principles
of our democratic society. What role do these moral reasons play in our deliberative society?

To what extent do the civilian and the citizen intermingle in function? To answer this
fundamental concern, we will use the arguments put forth by Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson in their work Democracy and Disagreement to frame the discussion of need for

moral deliberation.
Gutmann and Thompson ask the question: “If moral arguments are essential to justify
the foundations and results of democracy, then why should they not also be essential within

the ongoing process of democracy?”11 If we believe that we could debate about the values
that founded our democracy, why should we not debate about the values that could guide

it further? They believe that by using deliberation, we answer moral questions on moral
terms, a uniquely satisfying way of resolving these issues.12

Gutmann and Thompson

go over four causes of moral disagreement: a scarcity of resources, insufficient generosity,
incompatible values, and misunderstanding values.
On one hand, it seems that there are questions about resource distribution. Is it moral

to have a few super-rich people, while the majority is poor? Is it fair to tax the wealthy
differently than other economic groups? Gutmann and Thompson argue, “The hard choices
that democratic governments make in these circumstances should be more acceptable even

to those who receive less than they deserve if everyone’s claims have been considered.”13
The government needs strong reasons to justify resource distribution, and these reasons are

stronger when put in terms of deliberative discourse.
11
12
13

Gutmann et al., p. 40.
Gutmann et al., p. 41.
Gutmann et al., p. 41.
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The second element of these questions of resources is the issue of human generosity.

They claim moral disagreement occurs is because we are not generous enough with the
resources we have. Moral deliberation provides a solution: “by creating forums in which
citizens are encouraged to take a broader perspective on questions of public policy,”14 we
can encourage them to think more on the value of their fellow man. Charity becomes a
natural inclination when people value others like they do themselves.
Another major area of moral disagreement identified by Gutmann and Thompson
is incompatible values. They think our lack of knowledge of the values of others and the
incompatibility of some moral values demand a solution only deliberation can provide. Each
of us has a certain set of values, and sometimes these values clash. Sometimes, there is middle
ground on moral issues, and we can combine our visions. However, some moral issues are
beyond compromise. If these values are beyond compromise, what is the use of discourse?

Gutmann and Thompson have claimed that merely discussing these issues contributes to
our ability to respect and understand contrary views. They think that refining the dialogue
between separate parties “can begin to isolate those conflicts that embody genuinely moral

and incompatible values on both sides”15 which will allow us to bargain and settle conflicts
easier. These sorts of benefits also appeal to the next notion that Gutmann and Thompson
introduce. The idea of misunderstanding other sets of morals or values is also closely linked
to the conception of incompatible values. Our ignorance of each other’s views can lead to

moral disagreement where there need not be if we had a better grasp on the values of our
peers.
Gutmann and Thompson believe there are also significant pragmatic reasons that
our society should embrace value-based reasoning in public discourse. They think that other

avenues to settle moral disagreements are insufficient; without discourse, we cannot even
begin to approach or appeal to agreed-upon truths.16 They also believe that the judiciary
and the legislature are generally insufficient in the status quo to address the breadth and
14
15
16
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Gutmann et al., p. 42.
Gutmann et al., p. 43.
Gutmann et al., p. 44.
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depth of moral disagreement. They remind us that “moral deliberation, however imperfect

it may be, is already present in public life in many different forms”17 and needs to be
harnessed in the best way possible, namely through deliberation. Altogether, Gutmann and

Thompson give us a vision of deliberation on values as being not only possible, but also
necessary and inevitable. What is more, we should desire this deliberation because it lets us

shape our political decisions even more adeptly.
Here we arrive at the crux of my concern—how civilian values can interact in the
deliberative system. My belief is that the inclusion of these personal or civilian values as
reasons in the political discourse has unacknowledged difficulties, and even if these barriers
did not exist, the overall result of including these types of reasons in the value constellation
of the State would cause undue harm. In the simplest terms, I believe that if we include our
personal values in the political discourse, we do harm to each other and to our democratic

institutions themselves.
The values that we as a civilian hold and use to form our conception of the good life are
fundamentally different from those that the citizen holds and uses to guide our democratic
institutions. The first difference is one of purpose; the fundamental values of the society are,
like our civilian values, a means to an end. The fundamental values are means to the end of
a democratic life. Our civilian values are means to an end of a good life. I believe this is an
important and powerful distinction.. These two sets of values both shape our behavior and

the decisions we make as well as help us justify courses of action. However, fundamental
values are fixed and shared among all citizens, whereas civilian values are subject to a far
greater amount of variety.
The second difference is the source of values that we exercise. The fundamental values
are in part shaped by society, by our forefathers and our founders. We need look no further
than the guiding documents of American democracy to see how our current understanding
of foundational values is shaped by the society around us. What sets our foundational values

apart from their civilian peers is that our foundational values are additionally shaped and
17

Gutmann et al., p. 47.
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sourced in a distinct purpose. They are based on a better-defined image of the democratic
life or the democratic citizen. While we may disagree on the nuances, what constitutes the

democratic person is clear. We want a citizen to be able to participate in the deliberative
system, to provide and understand good reasons, and to help shape our system. Our civilian

values are markedly different because they are given to us not by necessity of democratic
involvement, but by external actors and personal realization. I have already conceded that
some of our conceptions of the foundational values of our democratic societies come from

external sources, from leaders and teachers; so, what is the important difference we have
arrived at?
Essentially, civilian values are based on exclusively personal experiences and teachings,
either by strong societal forces or individual learning. Some values are too costly for us to

learn on our own; these values society teaches us because they are linked to democratic
citizenship. Gutmann and Thompson eagerly acknowledge this point as the primary source

of moral disagreement. They note, “moral conflicts can be understood and experienced
by one person appreciating the competing claims of more than one fundamental value,
and therefore struggling internally to resolve the conflict.”18 The standard of acceptable
moral disagreement should not exclusively apply to fundamental value debates. It extends

into commonly held conceptions of right and wrong that may or may not be commonly
understood. These other values are not as closely linked to the fundamental values that help

to drive the engines of our democracies.
Modern democratic societies are heterogeneous not only in belief system, but also
in a laundry list of other factors that might influence how one sees the world. We can
look to environment as an important factor in shaping the types of values one is likely to
have. The perspective that we derive of self and the environment in which we interact is
invaluable to how we assess our values. Indeed, this claim seems so natural that it scarcely

requires anything beyond assertion. Even in my certainty, I will readily concede that I
could be wrong, and it would still be insignificant for my claims. More important than the
18
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Spring 2010 | SPICE | Philosophy, Politics & Economics Undergraduate Journal

content of our values is the nature of our perception of those values, which is necessarily
individual. How long have laborers and philosophers been trying to answer the question
“what is good?”19 To edge into the absurd: would identical twins, raised in identical homes,
living identical lives, be able to agree on the meaning of happiness? Even if we believe that
we agree on a term or expression of a value, to what extent are we actually agreeing, and to

what extent is our agreement empty?
I think that the deeply personal nature of experience-driven civilian values makes
it extremely difficult for us to say that we can gain the type of common language and
shared sense of purpose that deliberation seems to require of us. If our civilian value reasons

can never truly be understood, then what is the use of value discourse at all? Can it not
also be concluded then that value discourse over our fundamental values is equally empty?

However, we have already seen how fundamental values are substantially different. They
have a common purpose, which makes them more substantial and accessible. We cannot
test what is ‘good,’ but we certainly can evaluate to see if someone has the capacity for free

speech.20
I would posit then that the real danger of our inability to agree on the nature of
civilian values is the instability it creates. We would need some sort of coherent image of
the good life to allow us to treat civilian values the same as fundamental values in political

discourse. I think the complications we might face arise when other parties either in our
own time or later must interpret these principles. The number of transitions of authority,
culture, and beliefs that even young nations have undergone should make us wary of putting

any faith in principles that cannot be clearly defined or that lack guidance.
Let us assume, however, that not only can we understand each other when we
speak of civilian values, but that we can discuss them and make decisions which would
seem consistent with the guidelines set forth by the demands of deliberative democracy.
19
Again, we might see the aforementioned hubris in seeking to determine what sort of good life is most desirable, or what the actual role of government is, and instead resolving to accept a system where we answer neither
of these questions in a satisfying manner and simply say, “let citizens figure it out for themselves.”
20
The obvious response to this is the question of if we, as a society, were to develop a standard of fairness
that was verifiable in the way that we might see freedom of speech as being verifiable.
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Even in these circumstances we need to ask if we can accept the decisions found. We are
motivated by civilian values to find paths and choices that affirm our beliefs and principles

and, at heart, affirm us as people. Our visions of the good life are not just goals to be
attained, but intimately linked to our sense of sense and self worth. We risk this when we

include civilian reasoning in our moral discourse.
When the State or society rules on questions of civilian values through the
deliberative process, they are electing not only to affirm certain types of values as integral
to living the good life, but are also implicitly (or perhaps explicitly) rejecting others sets of
values. The process of deliberation is good for a few things; it is good for giving the decisions
that we guide our government to do a sense of justice and defensibility. It is good because
the process leads us to consider the choices we make in such a way that respects the dignity
of our fellow man. It works because citizens utilize it with a specific set of values in mind

and a specific aim. The system of deliberation, however, is not suited to comfortably pass
judgment on methods of the good life.
One scenario where we might ask the deliberative system to help guide our
judgment in a moral context is healthcare and the distribution of resources within our
healthcare system. Obviously the amount of energy we can devote to the care of any one
person or the curing of any one disease is finite, hence the issue of inadequate resources.
There is also the need to determine if one utile of energy being used in one area is as valuable

or justifiable as in others. We could spend one million dollars on new machinery for
detecting cancer, or we could spend that same million providing for more emergency room
doctors. It seems clear that we need some method of deciding questions like these, and to

Gutmann, Thompson, and others, we do this by using value reasons, particularly civilian
values, as justification. If we expend our resources on the cancer-detecting machinery, we
are consuming the opportunity cost of not spending money elsewhere. We are saying that it
is more important that individuals who may have cancer be given a better chance at a longer
life, that some element of this type of living should be valued over the types of benefits we
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would get from making sure emergency room doctors are better rested and better funded.

We might even suggest to fund curing the common cold, saying that the small amount
of suffering of which each victim is relieved is greater than the amount of suffering that
remains by not spending our resources elsewhere.
Gutmann and Thompson believe that the deliberative system gives us adequate
guidance to answer these questions and that formulating reasons in a reciprocal nature
and having consensus built represent adequate justification. Insofar as these decisions may

be seen as political, then the method , and I agree. What I struggle to see is whether this
is even the realm of politics. There is not adequate justification to draw this right into the
deliberative process at all, or at the very least, to allow the government to decide in terms of
civilian values. Is morality really something that can, or should, be decided by committee?

One might claim that the government is not passing judgment on a concept of morality
but rather the democratic system responding to the needs of its citizens. This type of claim,
and the claim that the government has the authority to condone a certain vision of the good

life, is highly problematic.
At its heart, when the deliberative process is applied to questions of morality and
derives a result that is internally consistent with the standards of deliberation, the result
is not merely a suggestion. We cannot forget the nature of authority that is assigned to
deliberation. Deliberation and the results of deliberation remain sources of trust and truth.

If deliberation speaks on questions of morality, or specifically on questions of civilian
value and their moral worth, it does so with power. We can see the application of moral
deliberation as giving strong directives on the nature of the good life, and perhaps even
explicitly forbidding certain models; however, why should it problematic that we use the
tools at our disposal to enforce a certain model of living?
One objection is one rooted in the question of from where this right is derived.
It is understandable, and perhaps defensible, that a stable and finite society might wish to
enforce certain models of the good life. However, we must recall that the responsibility of
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government is to shape conditions for the pursuit of the good life as a citizen. By permitting

the government to make judgments on the good life, we are allowing it to functionally
deny individuals in the present the capacity to pursue some models. The government is also
limiting the capacity of future participants in the society to live a different conception of the
good life. Deliberation is based on the idea that we provide reasons that others would find
acceptable; is it possible for us to access reasons from unborn children or future immigrants

to our society? Perhaps, but future actors are denied the capacity to give their consent or
accept the reasons we are giving now.
This claim can be countered on a few counts. It can be challenged by invoking
the virtue of revision; we may pass laws consistent with current views of the good life
and, if necessary, revisit them and debate their merits in the future. Further, it might be
possible that even if the letter of the law encourages certain models of the good life, it
does not prevent discourse from occurring elsewhere. However, I believe that the authority
which deliberation carries stymies debate because citizens would be in essence questioning

the foundation of their democratic society, the status quo. Grossly immoral laws persist
because their existence alone lends credence to their advocacy; we need look no further
than examples like slavery, Jim Crow, and opposition to the enfranchisement of women as

examples of status quo being accepted without debate.21
Perhaps the barriers that stifle discourse and debate can be overcome in a sufficiently

developed society, one that is careful to educate and inform its population.22 The greatest
harm I see is related to the individuals who are on the losing side of these deliberations based

on civilian values. We have seen that deliberation demands that we provide and accept
reasons that are in essence agreeable to everyone. I may provide reasons that 99% of us come
21
Ely discusses the necessity of clearing obstructions to open deliberation. “Perspective is critical, and one
whose continued authority depends on the silencing of other voice may well in all good faith be able to convince himself that a reason a more objective observer would label inadequate is in fact compelling” (Ely 107). His comments
should encourage us to be wary of individual’s capacity for seeing reasons and values in such a way to suit their own
purpose – and that purpose can be simply to affirm the status quo.
22
It seems that the barriers to successfully deliberating are high enough already to assume this is a plausible circumstance. When Rousseau writes that “Liberty, not being a fruit of all climates, is not within the reach of
all people” (Rousseau 250) he is reminding us that democracy is not easy and is suited best to a reasonably wealthy
modern people.
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to accept but there are always holdouts; this is a situation that Gutmann and Thompson
accept when they invoke our incompatible values as a source of moral disagreement. What
happens to those who have values that simply cannot be accepted by the whole and who, as

a matter of course, find themselves excluded?
On one hand, society is telling these individuals that they must revise their vision
of the good life, that somehow their perception of what it takes to be a full and happy
person is inadequate or incorrect. Again we face an issue of authority – the deliberative
system is strong, but not perfect, and the strength of the system is in the acceptance of the

difficulty of determining just what is right or wrong. Deliberation and its results are not
absolute cure-alls, and the essence of deliberation is the consideration of many different
possible views. To rule certain views out is antithetical to the purpose of this methodology

of government and justice.
A potent warning of the potential for this sort of result can be found in the issue
of gay marriage. Deliberation about gay marriage should dismiss the types of reasons that

are obviously flawed, including notions of homophobia and discrimination. Other types
of appeals though, like the value of family structures, can find broad support and persuade

many while remaining consistent with the ideas of deliberation. Let us imagine that the
deliberative system were put into effect, and most, although not all, participants came to
accept a vision of the good life that prohibited gay marriage. Once more we cast questions
over from where this right to shape values comes, but more importantly is how a decision
of this manner affects those who saw their values dismissed as impossible or incompatible.

In the example of gay marriage we can see the profound effects of political choices
motivated by civilian morality. Denying a person the right to marry as they see fit, and for
reasons that do not apply to them, robs them of autonomy and human dignity. Our society

affirms the value of marriage as a celebration of love and companionship, elements of
personal happiness to which we can all relate. By denying a homosexual person the capacity
to marry in a way that could affirm them as people is denying their capacity to live a good
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life at all. It is telling them that who they are at the core of their being is not compatible
with the type of good life their society values for all people – implicitly excluding them from
the category of people altogether. This is a dramatic example, but it illustrates how denying

access to certain methods of the good life is limiting the real expression of the humanity
of those who would want to pursue that vision. If the question then emerges “can we ever
condemn a vision of the good life,” we can respond by appealing to the fundamental values

of our society. The duty of the citizen is to ensure each of us has the ability to be active
citizens and the capacity to pursue the good life. Some visions of the good life, such as
neo-Nazism, misogyny, etc., must essentially deny these freedoms to some members. The
government can step in when it can be demonstrated that one’s vision of the good life robs

another of their capacity to be citizens and to pursue their own civilian values.
Even if we were to accept that moral discourse was not only possible but internally
just for ourselves and others and that the authority itself was legitimate, I would still be
concerned about using civilian values in our deliberative discourse. I believe that using
civilian values to shape the choices made by citizens, who are primarily guided by
the instrumental and fundamental values of a state, is an unacceptable risk. Doing so
undermines the authority of the deliberative system and diminishes its capacity to fulfill
its primary duty. The strength of the deliberative system can be found in two core pillars:
its willingness to concede that many views have merit rendering attempts to determine the
best values empty, and its attentiveness to the duty of promoting democratic citizenship. I

believe that including civilian values in the deliberative discourse weakens both.
When the deliberative system attempts to assign certainty to uncertain principles
or terms, it diminishes the authority of the process and organization itself. In these
circumstances, the citizen, the deliberative system, and the government itself are endangering

their integrity by assigning importance and value where none is due or certain. We are
certain of the values that guide the citizen because we understand their purpose in clear
notion of goal fulfillment. But when deliberation passes judgment on civilian values, it
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is investing itself and the authority it holds in that decision. We have shown how some
values—the fundamental values—are integral to citizenship and civilian life; these are the

vital organs of the body politic. To assign comparable merit to other values, no matter
how certain you may be of their existence and form, begs us to question the source of that
information. Using civilian values to shape citizen’s decisions is inviting non-instrumental

or non-fundamental reasons into the pantheon of reasons that the society had previously
agreed were valuable in a very particular way.
Bringing reasons and values created by the civilian persona into comparable
status with the fundamental values of the society endangers not only the reputation of
the deliberative process, but muddles deliberation’s mission. In a chicken-egg type
phenomenon, the same persons who would use deliberative democracy to find justified
value statements of the civilian nature require a deliberative system untouched by the types

of claims they desire to make. In a bare deliberative system, where the only values are the
fundamental citizen values, the focus of the government and the citizen is to promote
democratic citizenship to the fullest extent. However, as soon as these citizens are asked to
value not just the fundamental democratic values that form good citizens, but other sets of
values, they must by necessity be distracted from their task. Now they are asked to balance

“rightness” as an open-ended value against directed values like freedom of speech.
When civilian values intrude on the grounds of democracy and citizenship, they hurt
the system’s capacity to progress and heal itself. Those who would wish to include civilian
values in the canon of instrumental values must then swallow two harms. Firstly, they are
preventing their citizenship from pursuing an unsullied goal of democratic citizenship. The
second harm that they must accept is that they are denying future generations the capacity
to critique and evaluate the values that they are imposing. The inclusion of these values is a
breach of the original covenant we agreed to when entering society to pursue our vision of
the good life. We agreed to enter this system without civilian values clotting the picture, and
we should provide this option to all those that followed us, and respect those that proceeded
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us who protected these values.
Even if we accept that the system could execute the inclusion of civilian values
flawlessly, we should still reject this option. A democracy is just because it embraces many

different voices, and it thrives because of these differences. If we operate from the initial
view that morality and values are fundamentally inconsistent, we should not seek to unify

them under the umbrella of the power of the government. It robs the democracy of too
much; it robs it of the nobility of the many voices and causes it to stagnate. Few today
would look at the values that guided civilian life a thousand years ago and view that life as
desirable for themselves. Few would look back five hundred, or even a hundred years ago,
and affirm those values. We value democracy by valuing it not for today or tomorrow, but
forever; we value democracy by not setting it against the tide of history, but casting it with

the river of humanity and allowing it to follow the current.
If we chose to neuter democracy of its purity, we cast ourselves under the throws of
a government no more legitimate than a kingship, and this kingship is not the benevolent
dictator or philosopher-king. It is a tyrant, of the past over the present, of the dead over the
living. Even if the future citizens can challenge our morals and remove our values from the

pantheon of democratic values, we do them and ourselves a disservice by weakening the
chain of continuity. To add our values to the core of democracy is an act of heresy. Adding

civilian values is not just misguided and difficult to justify; it is vandalism of democracy
itself. No matter how deeply we believe in the principles that we want to contribute to our

future and society, by adding to democracy we insult it.
Gutmann and Thompson make the case that we need a means of mediating moral
disagreement and that deliberation is that tool. This assertion was contested on three separate
levels. Firstly, we cannot truly understand the moral reasons that others provide. Secondly,
even if we can understand these reasons, the consequences of acting on moral reasons can
serve to deny the ability of some to pursue their vision of the good life, denying them the
respect that deliberation and democracy should permit them as human beings. Lastly, even
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in a system where we understand each other and our decisions respect basic principles of
justice, we diminish the uniqueness and strength of the values that enable democracy to
occur when we include civilian values alongside them. The need for us to have some means

to alleviate the pressure caused by moral disagreement still remains. Further, Gutmann
and Thompson’s claim that moral discourse is necessary to give moral affirmation to the
decisions our government sponsors must be addressed.
If the first concern is where these deliberations go when we remove them from the
political discourse, the answer is relatively straightforward: into the popular discourse. The
function of adding these civilian value debates to the political dialogue is the notion that our
beliefs on the good life are deserving of consideration by others. We seek to persuade others

to model our vision of the good life so that they too might lead such a life. The question
here then, is not where do they go, but why they had to be conducted in the deliberative
system in the first place. If I am compelled to remove my values from the political dialogue,
does this rob me of the capacity to pursue persuasion elsewhere? Hardly. If I consider the
actions of my peers to be immoral, I am welcome to tell them as such. I am even welcome

to phrase my condemnation in the same format that deliberation takes. Let us imagine
that I consider atheism to be an important component of the good life and that I feel that
all people would benefit by being atheist. I can still discuss the merits of atheism with my
Jewish friends. I might even discuss the merits of atheism in terms of universal acceptability,

in the language of deliberation. I can find like-minded peers and fund campaigns of such
discussions, and I can try to persuade all members of society that the government, as an
important element of democratic citizenship, should provide resources for such campaigns.
There is still the ample room for a dialogue about morality and values to occur outside of
the political realm. Perhaps the more interesting question is what happens when two values

find themselves in conflict, without the possibility of peaceful resolution. Here, we must
answer in two ways. Why is it the concern of a government that rejects the universalisability
and absoluteness of values to provide recourse in these situations? Why should we seek to
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resolve irresolvable value discussions if we believe there to be no true resolution? I believe

the burden is on the citizen within each of us to approach such circumstances knowing
full well that the outcome may not be what we want and accept this as a celebration of
democracy. The second response is that if these value sets are so opposed to each other
that violence is inevitable, that restraint and debate is impossible, then the government has
legitimate cause to intervene. Violence and the threat of violence in one’s place of living and

community would inhibit democratic citizenship, and this is a barrier which democracy
cannot accept. The government can and should step in.
The second question is the more complex of the two; where does the moral
affirmation of our decisions come from if not from moral discourse? We should not seek

the affirmation of civilian values on decisions couched in the values of the citizen, as the
highest moral claim that a democracy can make is avoiding the need for acceptance in
terms of civilian values. Gutmann and Thompson claim we should “agree that democratic

institutions are not justified unless they generally yield morally acceptable results”23 – that
our quest for justifiable decisions must seek the highest level of affirmation and that we
can only attain this by adding moral affirmation. But why does this contribute to the
acceptability of the decisions we make? These moral reasons, couched in civilian values, are

difficult to include. They harm more than they heal, and ultimately they are an insult to
democracy itself. If we enter our democracies and societies with the goal of freeing ourselves,

we satisfy the demands of that freedom by satisfying and paying homage to the tools and
terms of the contract. We affirm the standards of democracy not by the standards that we

develop for each other but by affirming the standards of democracy itself. If we want to
seek morally acceptable results, we should not try to imbue our decisions with our values,
but we should try to invest our decisions with the values that permit democracy to occur. If
democracy is the tool to allowing us to pursue to good life, we do each other and ourselves

the greatest service possible by maintaining and strengthening that tool.
My goal in this work has been to caution against the inclusion of our personal
23
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values in the deliberative process of our democracies. I have warned against the difficulty
of doing so and the dangers we face by ruling on questions of the good life. Gutmann
and Thompson want us to account for the moral disagreement found in our society, a fair
request. They want to invest our politics with more authority to make rulings that we will
find more acceptable. I believe their respect for deliberation leads to their desire to see it be
used to the greatest extent possible to help guide our actions. I too believe in deliberation,
but I believe that we need to restrain ourselves. Democracy and deliberation were not built
for the purpose of guiding us into the good life. It is against the nature of these institutions
both in terms of the reasons they were founded, and they are ill-suited to answer these sorts
of questions. To exercise the tools of political deliberation to answer questions of the good
life, of right and wrong, of morality, is straining the limits of what it can accomplish, and

this straining must inevitably weaken the whole of these institutions. We must recognize
that the greatness of democracy and deliberation are in the emptiness of both, in their
hesitation and inability to make moral claims, and that we serve ourselves best by allowing

these institutions to remain bare and skeletal.
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